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ABSTRACT Information security recognised the human as the weakest link. Despite numerous interna-
tional or sector-specific standards and frameworks, the information security community has not yet adopted
formal mechanisms to manage human errors that cause information security breaches. Such techniques have
been however established within the safety field where human reliability analysis (HRA) techniques are
widely applied. In previous work we developed Information Security Core Human Error Causes (IS-CHEC)
to fill this gap. This case study presents empirical research that uses IS-CHEC over a 12 month period
within two participating public and private sector organisations in order to observe and understand how the
implementation of the IS-CHEC information security HRA technique affected the respective organisations.
The application of the IS-CHEC technique enabled the proportions of human error related information
security incidents to be understood as well as the underlying causes of these incidents. The study captured
the details of the incidents in terms of the most common underlying causes, selection of remedial and
preventative measures, volumes of reported information security incidents, proportions of human error,
common tasks undertaken at the time the incident occurred, as well as the perceptions of key individuals
within the participating organisations through semi-structured interviews. The study confirmed in both cases
that the vast majority of reported information security incidents relate to human error, and although the
volumes of human error related incidents pertaining to both participating organisations fluctuated over the
12 month period, the proportions of human error remained consistently as the majority root cause.
INDEX TERMS Human error assessment and reduction technique (HEART), human error related
information security incidents, human reliability analysis (HRA), information security, information security
core human error causes (IS-CHEC).
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of information security has developed numerous
standards and frameworks governing how information should
be processed by organisations. These standards include the
ISO27000 series [1], Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard [2] and also sector specific policies and standards
such as the Data Security and Protection Toolkit [3] applied
to the National Health Service in Britain. Despite numerous
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Junaid Arshad .
international and sector-specific standards and frameworks,
the information security community has not adopted a formal
mechanism to deal with human errors, such as the application
of human reliability analysis (HRA) techniques [4], [5] which
are widely used in high reliability sectors [6].
In previous work we demonstrated that human errors
account for the majority of incidents [7]. These incidents
pertain frequently to unintentional human error compared to
intentional and possibly malicious action, technology fail-
ings, procedural failings or weaknesses in physical controls
[7]–[9], and are still occurring without resulting in any key
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changes to common organisation practices to address these
issues. People are susceptible to slips and lapses [10], which
can affect the accuracy of tasks and often result in information
security incidents. Yet despite this well understood limitation
of workers, we identified that there is a comparative lack of
prevention techniques and literature related to unintentional
human error in information security assurance when com-
pared to technology vulnerability or malicious intent includ-
ing insider threat as outlined later in this paper.
As part of our broader research into information secu-
rity related human error, we have undertaken and published
related research which proactively applies the IS-CHEC tech-
nique [11]. This research uses a questionnaire delivered to
operational employees [11] rather than information security
professionals acting reactively to reported incidents. The
proactive use of IS-CHEC was applied within the same pri-
vate sector organisation as applied within this article and
provides an employee’s perspective on human error and sug-
gested controls to enable risk quantification across the organ-
isation to be performed.
The focus on the detection and prevention of human error
in an information security setting is less established com-
pared to high reliability sectors, such as NASA [12] where
numerous HRA techniques have been evaluated and applied.
It has also been established and published that with regard
to human error related incidents, the human is not actually
the cause of an incident but in fact the consequence of wider
organisational failings [13].
This paper evaluates the application of the Information
Security Core Human Error Causes (IS-CHEC) technique [8]
applied to information security incident management over a
12month period of timewithin participating public sector and
private sector organisations simultaneously. The IS-CHEC
technique is an adaptation of the Human Error Assessment
and Reduction Technique (HEART) which has been in use for
30 years within industries such as rail, aviation, nuclear and
healthcare to address the human error issue [14]. The HEART
HRA technique was selected as the most applicable to an
information security setting due to its accuracy, compatibility,
needed resources, output and comprehensiveness [9]. The
IS-CHEC technique was embedded within the information
security incident management practices, as a component of
our wider empirical action research to establish the root cause
of reported incidents and, where the root cause is identified
as being unintentional human error, to delve deeper into
the underlying causes, and finally, to apply a framework of
remedial and preventative measures to resolve the incident
and prevent a re-occurrence.
The principal motivation and research hypothesis behind
this work was to establish if the IS-CHEC information secu-
rity HRA technique could have a positive or negative effect on
information security within public and private sector organi-
sations. If present, this positive effect would primarily mate-
rialise through a greater understanding of the proportions
and underlying causes of information security related human
error. The research establishes the most common causes of
information security human error related incidents within the
public and private sector organisations, as well as providing
valuable actionable insights into information security aspects.
An additional motivation is the potential to reduce human
error and, therefore, a decline in the volumes of reported
information security incidents.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Conducts real-time longitudinal empirical research
simultaneously within public and private sector organ-
isations using the IS-CHEC technique for the first time
within published literature.
• Presents the volumes and proportions of human error
related information security incidents, plus the associ-
ation between the proportions of human error related
incidents and the overall volume of information secu-
rity incidents, over the course of a 12 month period
of empirical research within public and private sector
organisations.
• Captures and presents the underlying themes pertaining
to tasks performed at the time of the incidents, underly-
ing causes and effectiveness of remedial and preventa-
tive measures.
These contributions will benefit academia through the pub-
lication of much needed empirical research into the effects
of human error within the field of information security.
Moreover, the contributions will not only positively bene-
fit industry and wider society initially through the partici-
pating organisations delivering healthcare services, but will
also subsequently provide an information security human
reliability technique that can be applied across multiple
sectors.
This paper presents the findings of a 12 month empirical
case study of the effectiveness of the IS-CHEC information
security HRA technique. The case study comprised of a
real-time analysis exercise within participating public and
private sector organisations following on from our previous
retrospective analysis case studies [9]. The research enables
further accuracy and evolution of the IS-CHEC technique
from previous studies due to the timely nature of investiga-
tions. This paper presents a comprehensive and detailed out-
put in relation to information security incident management,
specifically focusing on the incidents that relate to human
error. Therefore, this paper presents an established and tested
information security HRA which is applicable to be adopted
by a wider range of areas of information security to address
the current gap in knowledge and practice.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 presents related information security work and
associated literature. Section 3 details the research method
including the case study organisations, the data capture tech-
niques applied and also introduces the IS-CHEC information
security HRA technique. Sections 4 and 5 present IS-CHEC,
its adaptations, how it was implemented and the detailed
results of the case study. Section 6 presents the findings,
implications, comparisons with the literature and any lim-
itations of the method and technique. Finally, section 7
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captures the research conclusions and presents future work
on this topic.
II. RELATED WORK
A literature search was performed on 26/01/2019 using
the SCOPUS abstract and citation database for any article
published in 2019 using the search criteria of ‘Information
Security’ or ‘Cyber Security’. The search returned
324 articles. We reviewed the abstract for each of these
documents, and the full article where further understanding
was required, whereupon we established that 67 articles
were not information security related. From the remaining
257 articles it was found that 6 related to unintentional human
error which equates to 2%. Of these 6 articles only 1 was
primarily focussed on the topic of human error within the
field of information security which equates to 0.4%.
The human is recognised as being the weakest link in
organisational information security controls [15]–[20], which
has resulted in publications focussing on human factors
rather than technical aspects [16]. This is due to humans not
behaving securely when using systems [18] which makes
them a significant information security threat facing organ-
isations [16]. However, with appropriate controls applied,
the human can transform from the weakest link to the
strongest link [19].
Previous research [9] defines a human error related infor-
mation security incident as an ‘active failure’ by a person
(the threat) performing an ‘intentional action’ resulting in the
failure to complete a task as intended or achieve the desired
outcome due to the exploitation of a ‘latent condition’ (the
vulnerability). This can lead to a compromise or breach of
information confidentiality, integrity or availability or asso-
ciated law through the failure of technical or organisational
safeguards, and can cause disruption to business opera-
tions or causing harm or distress to individuals including
breaches of privacy.
Stewart and Jurjens [21] presented in their research an
empirical study which had found that 65% of data breaches
were due to loss of paper files and human carelessness.
Alavi et al. [22] presented similar findings, in which 64% of
security incidents are directly related to human error. Further
research presented by Asai and Hakizabera [23] suggests that
80% of information security breaches are caused by human
error.
The Cyber Security Breaches Survey [24] states that
human error is amongst the most common factors contribut-
ing to the most disruptive breaches, indicating that human
error is not only exposing organisations to the majority
of incidents, but also that those are the most impacting.
Veiga and Martins [25] refer to surveys and research con-
ducted by PriceWaterHouse and Ponemon Institute that
established that 58% and 35% respectively of information
security incidents and breaches were attributable to human
factors, although they do not differentiate between intentional
violations and unintentional human error. To add to this,
Hwang et al. [26] refer to external reports, which presented
that 14% of information exposures originated from organisa-
tional insiders.
The human factor is one of the most vulnerable aspects
of cyber security incidents [27], and as set out in literature,
the human factor is a most important component of infor-
mation security, perhaps more important than the technical
measures [28]. Human activity is the most critical factor in
the management of information security [21] with experts
growingly arguing that the main cause of information secu-
rity incidents mainly lies with employees’ behavioural fac-
tors rather than technical issues [29]. It was presented by
Rajamäki et al. [30] that employee negligence was a greater
concern to healthcare organisations than cyber-attack.
There also appears within information security literature
generally that there is a much greater focus on the human
factors being as a result of intentional action or attacks [31]
rather than unintentional human error, such as the 2017 Data
Breach Investigations Report [32].
Organisations should develop strategies to reduce informa-
tion security threats by employees [26] including focussing
on employees’ behaviour [17]. Health Information Systems
require rigorous evaluation that addresses human issues in
addition to technology and organisational issues [33], which
should lead to cultural change [34] and the implementation of
system designs, which will display warning messages when
user mistakes are made and prevent them from completing a
task [35].
In addition to proactive and strategic planning, retrospec-
tive analysis of incidents is important and can include root
cause analysis, which is oriented to the identification of
data associated with a specific occurrence [36]. Information
security management remains relatively weak in conducting
root cause analysis of minor incidents [37]. HRA can be
used to both support retrospective and predictive analysis, but
when applied to new fields this will have to be empirically
derived [38].
III. RESEARCH METHOD
This research is based upon empirical research within partic-
ipating organisations to drive information security improve-
ments and forms part of a wider programme of action research
study.
Action research is concerned with exploring and chal-
lenging real life situations within organisational settings in
order to solve problems through intervention [39]. It also
generates new knowledge which is useful for both research
and practice [40]. The research is based upon practical appli-
cation to offer a solution to the problem of current infor-
mation security incidents occurring as a result of human
error.
The research adopted participatory research within the
participating organisation settings in order to observe and
ascertain how the introduction of HRA techniques in an
information security environment affects the respective
organisations.
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A. RESEARCH SITES
The case study benefitted from two participating organisa-
tions. One organisation was a public sector body and the other
was a private sector organisation. Both organisations provide
healthcare services to the British National Health Service
(NHS) and, therefore, provide a reflective sample covering
public and private sector organisations. They also provide
insight into healthcare providers, which suffer from a large
proportion of information security incidents and breaches
related to human error [7].
The public sector organisation has approximately 2,000
employees and provides a range of services. Its incident man-
agement practices are required to support compliance with
legislation and government guidance. Information security
is governed centrally by the Head of Security and Informa-
tion Assurance and their small team, who are responsible
for the development of organisational strategy and policy
as well as oversight and engagement in all reported inci-
dents. Designated individuals, usually managers, within each
business area have responsibility for information security
application in addition to their primary role. These Business
area representatives are not dedicated information security
professionals, but attend formal governance sessions with
the information security team on a bi-monthly basis. The
organisation has an information security policy as well as an
information security incident policy and procedures in place,
which are communicated to all employees as part of annual
awareness requirements. Compliance in terms of awareness
are continuously monitored and acted upon.
The private sector organisation is a large service provider
operating in the United Kingdom. It has approximately
1,100 employees and provides a range of services to the
NHS. Its incident management practices are required to sup-
port compliance with international security standards, such
as the ISO27001 Standard, Cyber Essentials as well as the
NHS Information Governance Toolkit. Information security
is governed centrally by the Senior Information Risk Owner
and associated team, who are responsible for the development
of organisational strategy and policy. In addition, designated
information security leads have responsibility for every busi-
ness area to ensure full coverage and adherence.
B. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
We used semi-structured interviews and document reviews
as data capture techniques and instruments over a 12 month
period with both participating organisations simultaneously
as they applied the IS-CHEC technique. The research began
with the establishment of a researcher-client agreement [39],
which included ensuring a common understanding of the
research background, problem and intended solution. The
agreement also formalised objectives and clear responsibili-
ties for the participating organisation and researcher. Finally,
the agreement set out the duration of the research which was
agreed to be a minimum of 6 months, with the option for
the participating organisation to extend to 12 months. Both
organisations elected after 6 months to extend the research
to cover the full 12 month period. The research adhered to
De Montfort University (DMU) ethical standards and guide-
lines, and has been approved by the DMU ethics committee
(ref: 1516/325).
The research required the organisations to review their
respective incident management documentation and systems
to fully incorporate the IS-CHEC technique prior to begin-
ning the case study. Once the research had begun, a formal
monthly incident management meeting, which was already in
operation within both organisations, was expanded to include
a comprehensive IS-CHEC report as a standard agenda item.
The report was initially compiled and presented by the
researcher using a monthly incident register extract supplied
by the organisations each month. The organisations took
responsibility for report compilation and presentation from
month 10 upon mutual agreement. The report template can
be seen in the Appendices.
At the end of the research, semi-structured interviews were
undertaken with key individuals responsible for information
security and incident management as well as senior manage-
ment within both organisations. The interviews were face to
face, scheduled for one hour and digitally recorded. The inter-
views were subsequently transcribed, data coded and themat-
ically analysed using NVivo version 11 software. Within both
organisations it was important to interview personnel respon-
sible for using IS-CHEC, but also senior managers in both
organisations to gather their views and opinions. Therefore,
within the public sector organisation we interviewed the Head
of Security and Information Assurance (HoS&IA), Head of
Internal Governance, who was also the Deputy Senior Infor-
mation Risk Owner (Deputy SIRO) and Information Security
Manager (ISM). The ISM was responsible for the implemen-
tation of IS-CHEC. Within the private sector organisation,
we interviewed the Chief Operating Officer (COO), Senior
Information Risk Owner (SIRO), Information Security Man-
ager (ISM) and Information Security Incident Analyst. The
ISM and Information Security Incident Analyst were respon-
sible for the implementation of IS-CHEC. The interviewees
were asked to read and sign an informed consent form and
asked to describe their role in the organisation, their responsi-
bilities and the tasks or activities they are involved in and how
this integrates with wider organisational information security.
The interviewees were then asked the seven questions listed
below in order to capture contextual qualitative information to
ascertain their respective perceived applicability and effects
of IS-CHEC on their role and organisation, any new learning,
any overall thoughts on the study and finally their understand-
ing of the underlying causes of information security related
human error which would support the principal motivation
behind the study.
• Could you explain your understanding of the IS-CHEC
technique, the engagement you have had with the tech-
nique and what impact this has had on your role?
• Do you feel that the IS-CHEC technique, and its
components, such as GISAT and CHEC, is appli-
cable for an information security implementation?
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Please expand upon your response with as much detail
as possible.
• Tell me about the positive effects, if any, that IS-CHEC
has had on the organisation? Please expand upon your
response and provide positive examples if there are any.
• Throughout the course of the IS-CHEC information
security incident project, what would you say have
been the greatest challenges? Please expand upon your
response with examples if possible.
• Through the use of IS-CHEC have you learned anything
new about your organisation and its people in terms
of behaviours relating to information security? Please
expand on your response.
• On reflection, would you suggest any changes to the
organisation, approach taken, or the IS-CHEC tech-
nique? Please provide the rationale behind your sug-
gested changes.
• Do you have any other opinions or feelings about the
IS-CHEC information security incident project that you
would like to share?
To establish if there was a linear relationship between the
proportions of human error related information security inci-
dents and the overall volume of information security inci-
dents, we applied Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient using
the formula presented below. The variable ‘x’ relates to the
total number of incidents and ‘y’ relates to the number of
human error-related incidents. We then compared the results
attained for both organisations. The output is known as the r
coefficient.
r =
n∑
i=1
((xi − x¯)(yi − y¯))√
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2
n∑
i=1
(yi − y¯)2
(1)
The output from this formula is in the form of statistical
ranges from +1 through 0 to −1. A result of +1 would
identify a perfect positive correlation, 0 would identify that
there was no correlation and −1 would identify a perfect
negative correlation. As set out by Taylor [41], a result
of <=0.35 would be interpreted as a weak correlation,
0.36 – 0.67 would be interpreted as a modest correlation and
0.68 – 1.0 would be interpreted as a strong correlation.
In order to ensure research rigor in terms of validity and
reliability, a number of mechanisms were embedded through-
out the duration of the research. These methods aligned to
the four criteria for research validity and reliability, [42]–[44]
comprising of construct validity, internal validity, external
validity and reliability. This was primarily achieved through
the application of semi-structured interviews, routine formal
governance within each participating organisation including
a review of all incidents and the monthly IS-CHEC report,
agreement and application of clear research objectives as part
of the signed researcher-client agreement and also the strict
application of the IS-CHEC technique to provide demon-
strable cause and effect data related to human error related
information security incidents. Our findings were constantly
interpreted and reviewed in light of existing literature and
in consultation with the two participating public and private
sector organisations, to ensure that they are consistent and
that they accurately reflect the actual events. In addition,
the research was undertaken and compared within the two
participating organisations simultaneously and the required
research material, including the IS-CHEC technique, meth-
ods and results, to enable the research to be replicated has
been published in this article and prior articles relating to our
work [7]–[9], [11], [45], [46].
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we present a high-level introduction to the
IS-CHEC technique and also the further adaptations that have
been made to the technique over the course of the case study.
A. IS-CHEC INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW
The IS-CHEC technique is an adapted version of the HEART
technique that is split into two elements, which have been pre-
sented in our previous work [8]. These are an IS-CHEC map-
ping element and an analysis element. The mapping element
was appended to the participating organisations’ incident
registers to enable all recorded incidents to be analysed and
acted upon using IS-CHEC in terms of its components such
as General Information Security Affecting Tasks (GISAT),
Core Human Error Causes (CHEC), CHEC Weighting or
Significance (WoS) and Remedial and PreventativeMeasures
(RPM). RPMs are mapped to the identified CHECs for each
incident to enable consistent and effective incident manage-
ment. The IS-CHEC analysis element was a separate tool
from the mapping tool, which comprised of a number of
fields, which were used in order to allow the HEART in-built
likelihood calculations to be analysed against actual incident
likelihoods as part of the monthly IS-CHEC report. The
GISATs shown in Table 1 were mapped to a primary HEART
Generic Task Type (GTT) and associated nominal likelihood
of failure. As it was found that the context of a GISAT being
performed could affect the GTT mapping, alternate map-
pings were also captured. The complete list of CHECs and
results can be seen in Tables 5 and 6 which is an expansion
of the original HEART Error Producing Conditions (EPC)
[8], [47]. The full list of RPMs and their associated measure
of effectiveness, plus their results, can be seen in Table 7.
The IS-CHEC technique process flow is shown in Figure 1 as
applied to every reported information security incident. This
was required to be applied for every reported incident. Both
organisations applied quality assurance processes to ensure
incidents were investigated and that the associated inves-
tigation reports were accurate. Both organisations made it
clear that they expected employees to report information
security incidents immediately. They also both independently
set expectations that all information security incidents would
have the root cause analysis completed plus the identifica-
tion of IS-CHEC components and associated remedial and
preventative measures within 5 working days. There was no
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TABLE 1. GISAT mapping to the HEART Generic Task Types (GTT) [47].
expectation that all incidents would be fully closed within a
set timeframe although progress was continuouslymonitored.
The five root cause options applied as part of the case study,
and their results, can be seen in Tables 2 and 3. As per the
process shown in Figure 1, the IS-CHEC technique is only
applied where the root cause is identified to be a human error.
However, the capturing of all root cause options was useful
for the participating organisations in terms of trend analysis.
B. FURTHER ADAPTATION OF IS-CHEC
Over the course of the 12 month case study there were ongo-
ing reviews undertaken of the IS-CHEC technique and the
impact it was having each month as part of the respective
organisations’ incident management meetings. The changes
that have been applied to the IS-CHEC technique, as a result
of ongoing evaluation throughout the case study since it
was last published in literature [8], included the establish-
ment of a standard IS-CHEC reporting format, the expansion
of the GISATs to include ‘faxing information’ and ‘shar-
ing or handing over information or equipment in person’.
Two additional CHECs were introduced for ‘distraction/task
interruption’ and ‘time of day’ following a review of the
HEART EPCs [14]. A mapping of CHECs to RPMs was
also maintained throughout the case study. The CHEC-RPM
mapping is located in the Appendix of this paper. Over
the course of the study, the list of RPMs was enhanced
and modified based upon monthly formal incident man-
agement meetings which included a review of all inci-
dents and the monthly IS-CHEC report. This was intended
to encourage effective selection and application of actions
and support a reduction in reported incident volumes. The
introduced RPMs, due to incident review with the public
sector organisation, were RPM15 (split process and introduce
segregation of duties), RPM19 (recover, collect or destroy
information or equipment) and RPM20 (reissue or resend
information or equipment). In addition, the list of RPMs was
evaluated against published literature [48], [49]. This review
led to additional RPMs being agreed with the participating
organisations and added to the IS-CHEC technique and also,
very importantly, the strength of each RPM being deter-
mined. The introduced RPMs, due to literature review, were
RPM16 (eliminate or reduce distractions), RPM17 (elimi-
nate look-and-sound-alikes) and RPM18 (introduce warn-
ings, alerts or alarms). The literature described the strength of
each action as strong, medium or weak. However, the public
sector organisation was not comfortable reporting on their
people applying, or selecting, ‘weak’ actions. Therefore,
the strength wording was modified to reflect effectiveness
with the 3 indicators being higher effectiveness, moderate
effectiveness and lower effectiveness. The review of literature
enabled gaps in the IS-CHEC technique actions to be identi-
fied and addressed as well as adopting the strength from the
published literature. Other modifications, due to the literature
review, were RPM5 having the term ‘standardisation’ being
added in relation to procedures, tools, systems or practices
and RPM8 incorporating audit in addition to assessment.
V. RESULTS
In this section, results are presented in terms of incident
volumes and proportions of human error (sub-section A) and
association between the total volumes of information security
incidents and proportions of human error related incidents
(sub-section B). Both are aligned to the IS-CHEC technique
and its core components such as root cause, GISAT, CHEC
and RPM which are presented as underlying incident themes
(sub-section C). We also present the qualitative results of the
semi-structured interviews held with key individuals within
both organisations (sub-section D).
A. VOLUMES AND PROPORTIONS OF HUMAN ERROR
RELATED INFORMATION SECURITY INCIDENTS
In this sub-section we present the total number of incidents
experienced by both participating organisations as well as the
percentages of human error and other root causes. The results
for the public sector organisation can be seen in Table 2 and
Figure 2. The private sector organisation results are presented
in Table 3 and Figure 3.
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FIGURE 1. IS-CHEC incident process.
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TABLE 2. Public sector incidents.
FIGURE 2. Public sector incidents and proportions of human error.
Comparison: The respective participating organisations
realised differences in terms of the volumes of reported infor-
mation security incidents. The public sector organisation saw
an increase in reported incidents from the first month to the
last month, whereas the private sector organisation saw a
decrease. However, the public sector organisation did realise
a reduction in incidents over the last 2 months of the study.
Both organisations recorded the fact that human error
related information security incidents accounted for the
majority of incidents over the duration of the study and also
for every individual month.
B. LINEAR ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE TOTAL NUMBER
OF INCIDENTS AND PROPORTION OF HUMAN
ERROR RELATED INCIDENTS
As outlined within the research method section, we applied
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient to the total numbers of
incidents and the recorded human error related incidents in
order to obtain an r coefficient value. The calculations data
for both organisations can be seen in Tables 23 and 24 within
the Appendices.
The statistical analysis undertaken demonstrates a strong
association with the public sector organisation having an
r coefficient value of 0.975 and the private sector having an
r coefficient value of 0.981.
Comparison: The statistical analysis has shown that both
participating organisations have a strong, and similar, lin-
ear relationship between the total numbers of information
security incidents and the proportions of human error related
incidents over the 12 month duration of the study.
C. UNDERLYING INCIDENT THEMES
In this sub-section we present the results associated with
the core IS-CHEC technique components which are used
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TABLE 3. Private sector incidents.
FIGURE 3. Private sector incidents and proportions of human error.
to establish the underlying details associated with reported
incidents. These core components are GISAT, CHEC and
RPM.
General Information Security Affecting Tasks (GISAT):
The volumes of GISATs for both organisations can be seen
in Table 4. The 16 GISATs are utilised to establish the
actual task that was being performed at the time an incident
occurred.
Comparison: There was a correlation relating to the
types of tasks that were being performed when incidents
occurred. Although in a different order, both organisations
recorded GISATs 1, 2, 3 and 10 as part of the most com-
mon 5 GISATs providing a picture that communicating, edit-
ing or filing confidential or personal data by operational
administrative personnel accounted for the vast majority of
incidents.
Core Human Error Causes (CHEC): The 42 CHECs and
their volumes are presented in Table 5 for the public sector
organisation and Table 6 for the private sector organisation.
Each time an incident was recorded, the most significant
CHEC had to be recorded. The organisations were also
required to capture, where appropriate, a second most signif-
icant CHEC and a least significant CHEC.
Comparison:Both organisations clearly recorded the same
most common CHEC. CHEC 17 accounted for 56% of
recorded public sector incidents and 33% of private sec-
tor incidents. This presents a view that both organisations
detected that a lack of checks on the quality human output
and human fallibility was the most common underlying cause
of information security incidents.
Remedial and Preventative Measures (RPM): Each time an
incident was recorded it was required that both organisations
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capture at least 1 RPM. However, the organisations were able
to capture up to 5 RPMs for each incident. Table 7 presents
the total for each RPM captured for all incidents by both
organisations and Figures 4 and 5 present the percentages of
each RPM effectiveness category as applied.
Comparison: There were some key differences between
the two participating organisations in terms of the selection of
RPMs and their effectiveness plus the volume of actions per
incident. The public sector organisation recorded 254 actions
for their 200 recorded human error related information secu-
rity incidents. This equates to an average of 1.27 actions
for each incident. The private sector organisation recorded
645 actions for their 322 incidents, which equates to an
average of 2 actions per incident.
In addition, the public sector organisation RPMs included
9% with an indicated higher effectiveness, whereas 19% of
the private sector applied RPMs had a higher effectiveness.
Both the volumes of overall actions in proportion to the
number of recorded incidents, and the fact that the private
sector organisation applied a greater percentage of RPMs
with a higher effectiveness, could have been an influential
factor as to why the private sector organisation benefit-
ted from a reduction in reported information security inci-
dents, whereas the public sector organisation experienced an
increase.
However, there were also similarities with both organisa-
tions applying RPM1, 5 and 6 as the most common three
RPMs, although in a different order.
D. PARTICIPANT’S IS-CHEC UNDERSTANDING,
VIEWS AND OPINIONS
As outlined earlier we undertook semi-structured interviews
with participants, which comprised of seven open-ended
questions. The question responses were subject to transcrip-
tion, coding and thematic analysis using the NVivo version 11
software. The results are presented in Table 8.
Overall the key themes were that greater incident under-
standing was obtained relating to overarching incident trends
and patterns as well as specific incident details such as the
root cause. Another theme was that the undertaken research
benefitted both organisations in the form of enhanced buy-
in as a result of the used technique, which is uncomplicated,
and provides quality reporting which is understandable to all
stakeholders and works well.
The most common 20 words from the transcribed inter-
views are presented below in Table 9. In terms of themes,
the adoption of the IS-CHEC technique provided themes
of how it had promoted greater thought in terms of low
level incident understanding and acceptance of people and
their mistakes, as well as common themes around what
causes these mistakes to happen. In addition, both the words
‘actually’ and ‘know’ were commonly spoken providing an
indication of greater understanding of the facts relating to
incidents.
In addition to the overall summary (Table 8), there is an
expansion of the core themes captured through the semi-
structured interviews. These core themes included that both
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organisations felt the IS-CHEC technique was applicable to
an information security setting. This included that no further
changes were required to the technique and that the study
and use of the IS-CHEC technique had introduced positive
benefits including a greater understanding of their incidents,
plus the proportions of human error and underlying causes.
Other themes included acceptance and acknowledgment that
people will make mistakes, they should move away from a
blame culture as people are actually well intentioned and
want to do a good job and that the organisation should take
responsibility for failings. Themost prominent themes related
to organisational maturity at the beginning of the study, but
more importantly how essential organisational buy-in was in
order to achieve success.
All seven interviewees explicitly stated that the tool was
applicable to an information security implementation. The
private sector organisation COO stated: ‘‘It works for us.
I don’t know whether that’s because of the type of things
we’re doing in terms of the amount of paper and physi-
cal manual processing. I think it definitely works for us’’.
A theme in the responses was also that the technique provided
a simple mechanism to understand the specific details of the
incident through the GISAT component and the root cause
analysis and that it was applicable to a service provider situa-
tion with close working relationship with clients. The private
sector organisation ISM stated: ‘‘It is a fundamental way of
our business working well. Especially, with the nature of our
clients and what they want to see’’. In addition, interestingly,
it was suggested that the technique should be expanded for
all types of incidents and not be restricted to the management
of information security incidents only, due to the common
element being people and the successful results obtained.
The responses from all seven of the interviewees provided
views that they felt no changes were required to the IS-CHEC
technique, as it has proved to be simple, understandable
and effective. The public sector organisation HoS&IA stated:
‘‘I don’t think the IS-CHEC technique needs to be amended.
I think the way it is currently works’’ and the private sector
organisation Information Security Incident Analyst stated:
‘‘There are no improvements needed.
The private sector organisation expressed a key tangible
benefit of the study and adoption of the IS-CHEC tech-
nique was the reduction in information security incidents
and the fact that tolerances of human error could be docu-
mented and demonstrated to clients with their SIRO stating:
‘‘. . .measurable benefits of a massive reduction in our infor-
mation security incidents’’ and ‘‘It’s adding credibility to the
information. It’s always about backing up any answers that
we give with data and it gives us that data to be able to say
this happened and this is what we did because of this. To go
to client sessions and be able to evidence off the back of this
is massively powerful’’. The private sector organisation ISM
also stated ‘‘. . . seeing the incident numbers come down from
where we were which improves our client relationship’’. The
public sector organisation did not experience a reduction in
incident volumes, in fact they increased over the course of
the study, but felt that they would make improvements now
that they were in a more mature and informed position from
the Board-level down. The public sector HoS&IA stated:
‘‘. . . one of the most positive effects is Board awareness of
security incidents, where I think a year and a half ago we only
really got annual figures. Mainly, because the data wasn’t
there’’ and the Deputy SIRO also stated: ‘‘The positive effect
is we understand a lot better where our root causes are
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related to staff error than we ever did before’’. In terms of
senior management education, the private sector organisation
COO stated: ‘‘I haven’t done this type of technique. I think,
it has helped educate me around the level of expectation
and the level of risk that’s introduced with lots of human
handling around things and to help take that step back and
look at what we need to do and what we need to focus on.
So, I’ve definitely learned that, because, if this wasn’t done
I think we would still be scratching our head around some of
this’’.
As a result of the study, all seven interviewees demon-
strated a good awareness of incidents, the proportions and
effects of human error on the organisation. As expected,
the senior managers in both organisations were not aware
of the specific IS-CHEC technique component names but
were able to express an accurate understanding of human
error in terms of holistic views relating to trends, reporting
and underlying causes as a result of using the IS-CHEC
technique. The public sector HoS&IA demonstrated a con-
firmed understanding when a response to one of the questions
stated: ‘‘. . .we had an understanding, an idea, that most of
our incidents were to do with human error, but we didn’t
really have the stats and management information to back
that up’’. Whereas the private sector organisation ISM was
surprised by the confirmed proportions of human error in one
of their responses: ‘‘I was not aware of the high numbers of
human error before this work, and it is quite alarming. It is
not unsurprising now that we have seen the data, because it is
so easy to make a simple mistake’’. Responses also showed
a greater understanding of staff culture within respective
organisations.
As a result of the enhanced organisational understanding
in both organisations, there was an acceptance and acknowl-
edgment that people will make mistakes and a need to move
away from a blame culture. As an example of this, the private
sector COO stated: ‘‘. . . let’s face facts, people will always
make mistakes. So, there will always be an element of human
error if you’ve got highly manual processing. So we should
accept that that does happen’’. To support this view the public
sector organisation interviewees provided a form of empathy
with employees of the organisation in that they should not
be perceived as intentionally wanting to negatively impact
the organisation with the ISM stating: ‘‘What I’ve learned is
that people generally want to do a good job. An effective job,
in a secure way. They don’t want to be sending individuals’
personal data to the wrong people. The closer understanding
of the people that error pertained to showed a desire to
operate good security practices with theHoS&IA also stating:
‘‘I think before we engaged in this, I don’t think we believed
that staff were really security minded, but, I think, it has
opened my eyes that they are. Obviously, not all staff are, but
a lot more than what I gave credit for’’.
With a greater understanding of responsibility that rests
with the organisation rather than the individual that has suf-
fered an error whilst performing their role, both organisations
also conveyed that they were conscious that there was a
responsibility of the organisation to provide an environment
for their people that reduced the potential for human error.
The public sector organisation Deputy SIRO stated: ‘‘. . . I
want to fully understand why that mistake happened, where
did the process let the human being down and what can we
do to help a human being not do that again and this technique
just gives us all that’’ which was a view that was reinforced by
the same organisation’s ISMwho said the following: ‘‘. . . let’s
put the right controls in place to make sure it doesn’t happen
again, rather than attack the individual who’s probably actu-
ally been a victim of whatever the cause is. And it’s really
helped in that way’’.
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There were a couple of core themes relating to challenges
that were raised in the interviews pertaining to initial organ-
isational maturity and buy-in. With regard to initial maturity
the public sector organisation stated: ‘‘. . . this was not just a
step to the next level, but a step up a number of levels to what
we were doing’’ and also relating to the position at the end of
the study ‘‘. . . this has taken us to the next level. I think, all
the reports and MI we are getting, the KPIs we are building
from our side now put us on a good foot’’. This shows that
the organisation has, despite initial challenges, demonstrated
significant progress in terms of incident management matu-
rity through the study and use of the IS-CHEC technique.
The private sector organisation was felt to already be in a
mature position with regard to information security incident
management although the ISM did state: ‘‘...we would need
good reporting from the outset’’ showing that improvements
were needed to realise improvements quicker than experi-
enced throughout the study.
The most significant challenge for both organisations
related to initial buy-in from the wider organisation and
sub-contractors to adopt a new way of working and the
integration of the IS-CHEC technique. Also, making the
technique understandable, and simple, to all people that
needed to interact with it as part of the incident management
function. However, both organisations clearly presented that
through education, greater understanding and demonstrating
the benefits to the organisation, specific business areas and
individuals, the resistance was reduced and full engagement
and buy-in obtained over the course of the study. As exam-
ples of this, the private sector organisation SIRO stated:
‘‘Working with third parties is never easy and third parties
when you’re subcontracting to them. . . there’s scepticism ini-
tially, but they have seen the benefits of it. Not just our
customers also our subcontractors have certain benefits and
it’s delivered for their organisation. I think both a challenge
and an achievement in that respect’’, and the public sector
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organisation HoS&IA stated: ‘‘. . . its been difficult in some
areas to get across to the staff the importance of why we
are doing this. . . once you sit down and you talk through
the benefits and start sharing the MI and analysis that we’re
getting, then they do understand it’’.
Comparison: The organisations expressed very similar
patterns in terms of improved information security incident
management maturity and challenges around wider organisa-
tional buy-in. The key theme across both organisations was an
increased understanding of their respective employees, their
behaviours and challenges and context they work in, which
can affect information security posture.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
The principal finding of the research was providing further
evidence that the vast majority of information security inci-
dents do indeed pertain to human error, which supports our
previous work [8], [9], [45]. In the case of both organisations,
the mean average of proportions reported human error related
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FIGURE 4. Public sector RPM effectiveness percentages.
information security incidents over the 12 month period was
79% for the public sector organisation and 89% for the private
sector of all reported incidents.
A key finding from the independent case study research
undertaken in both organisations showed that the volumes
of information security incidents and human error and trend
FIGURE 5. Private sector RPM effectiveness percentages.
differed for both organisations. The public sector organisation
incidents fluctuated, but had a general increase up to month
10 and subsequent decrease in months 11 and 12. The public
sector was actively building maturity in terms of information
security understanding through recruitment of dedicated per-
sonnel, changes to systems and communication campaigns
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TABLE 11. Human Error Information Security Incidents by Business Area.
TABLE 12. RPMS by Month.
across the organisation. This is evident in month 1, where
4 incidents were reported and recorded, which was not reflec-
tive of the actual organisational position. The adoption of the
IS-CHEC technique allowed the public sector organisation to
TABLE 13. RPMs by Business Area.
TABLE 14. All RPMs.
TABLE 15. GISAT by Business Area.
focus on capturing incidents and their underlying causes and
is now in a much stronger and informed position. The private
sector organisation, however, was in a more established and
mature position in terms of personnel, systems and organ-
isational understanding at the start of the 12 month study.
They benefitted from a general trend of decreasing incident
volumes over the study period, as well as bettering their
understanding on the causes of human error, which continued
to account for the majority of incident root causes.
The study, through the use of Pearson’s Correlation Coef-
ficient, also established that within both organisations there
was a strong linear relationship between the total numbers of
recorded information security incidents and the proportions
of human error related incidents.
The qualitative data captured as part of the semi-structured
interviews supports the primary motivation behind the study,
which was to enable greater understanding of the proportions
of human error related information security incidents and
their underlying causes. According to all interview partici-
pants, the IS-CHEC technique added benefits for their role
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TABLE 17. Count of Systems or Processes & Nominal Likelihood of
Failure.
TABLE 18. Most Common Systems or Processes & HEART Nominal
Likelihood of Failure & Actual Likelihood of Failure.
and respective organisation and was applicable to an infor-
mation security setting, although success is dependent upon
effective organisational buy-in.
The study provides further evidence that HRA can be used
to support retrospective and predictive analysis of informa-
tion security [38]. The study also reinforced and demon-
strated views expressed in that the main cause of information
security incidents relates to an organisation’s employees [29].
The case study also presents data supporting an argument
against the low proportions of human factor root causes of
incidents and breaches presented in literature [26], [50].
TABLE 19. Systems or Processes by Business Area.
TABLE 20. Most Significant CHECs.
TABLE 21. Total CHECs.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS
The research provides solid evidence that the information
security field would benefit from the formal development and
application of HRA techniques, such as IS-CHEC, to address
the issue of human error and its information security impact
which is not currently the case. HRA is established within the
safety field, and the information security field would benefit
from these methods too as a common denominator is the
people that are an integral component of both.
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE METHOD
The research found that the time taken to undertake the root
cause analysis within both organisations took longer than
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TABLE 23. Public Sector Organisation Correlation Data.
expected with an average of 37% public sector incidents
having their expected root cause analysis completed within
the 5-day expectation and 71.5% for the private sector organ-
isation. Also public sector reported incidents on average were
open for 49.3 working days before they were closed and
the private sector organisation for 40.5 working days. This
impacted upon the speed of selection and implementation
of RPMs, but also resulted in the monthly IS-CHEC reports
containing incomplete information, which were required to
enable strategic action to be taken. It was also found that the
time duration from incident reporting to incident closure did
not happen quickly, which again added delay to experiencing
the intended organisational benefits, such as a reduction in
incident volumes.
A limitation of the method is also that it is dependent on a
mature and established information security culture, whereby
all employees are aware of what constitutes an information
security incident and that they must all be reported. Both
organisations acted independently in the recruitment of addi-
tional personnel to process information security incidents
during the research as a result of the continuous analysis of
incident volumes and trends. As HRA was not established
within information security practices prior to the research,
there was a continual state of learning for all involved, which
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also included newly recruited information security personnel.
In addition, the public sector organisation in particular strug-
gled to obtain buy-in and collaboration from the wider busi-
ness areas to enable incidents to be processed as quickly as
desired.
As this research was applied to two independent public
and private sector organisations, the findings are felt to be
generally applicable to organisations outside of this research
that undertake large amounts of manual processing of per-
sonal or confidential information. This is due to the com-
mon element being people and their behaviour, which is at
the core of all organisations. However, as both participating
organisations provide healthcare services, there is a potential
limitation of the research in that the captured results could
present a bias towards the healthcare sector and associated
services.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The research found that within the participating organisations
the common tasks that were being performed and associ-
ated with incidents were administrative tasks, which related
to the communication, editing or storage of confidential or
personal information. The research also established that the
most common cause of human error related information secu-
rity incidents was a lack of checking to detect and protect
against human fallibility. It was also notable that in both
organisations the most common RPM was RPM1 – Aware-
ness and training undertaken (including 1:1), which has a
lower effectiveness due to the fact that it relies upon memory
to prevent a reoccurrence [49]. It was also noticeable that
the private sector organisation was willing to apply more
remedial and preventative measures to address human error,
and, in particular, difficult measures that attract a higher
effectiveness were successful in benefiting from a clear and
recognisable reduction in both human error and overall infor-
mation security incidents.
This research provides empirical evidence and clarity to
the information security community as to the high propor-
tions of human error that should be expected and catered
for. In addition, it was found that although the volumes of
human error related incidents occurring in both participating
organisations fluctuated over the 12month period, the propor-
tions of human error remained consistently as the majority
root cause. It was also established that both organisations
experienced a strong linear relationship between the total
number of incidents and the proportions of human error
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related incidents. This provides a view that the IS-CHEC
technique was successful in providing benefit through
increased understanding of human error risk exposure
for the participating organisations and either reduced or
reducing incident volumes following a peak, which coincided
with organisational awareness and understanding campaigns.
However, the fact remains that a common characteristic of a
human being is that we will make mistakes and organisations
should formally adopt HRA techniques, such as IS-CHEC,
to address this fact.
APPENDICES
A. IS-CHEC REPORT TEMPLATE
Introduction
Executive Summary
Human Error Information Security Incidents
Reporting Period
See Tables 10–21.
B. CHEC AND RPM MAPPING
Remedial and preventative measures (RPM) were selected
and applied according to the identified Core Human Error
Causes (CHEC). A mapping of CHECs and RPMs can be
found in Table 22 below to aid selection of consistent and
effective controls.
C. PEARSON’S CORRELATION COEFFICIENT DATA
See Tables 23 and 24.
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